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introduction
PLUTARCH AT THE CROSSROADS
OF RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY
Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta
Plutarch of Chaeronea, who was born to a wealthy family in 45ce, received
the best education at home and abroad. He frequently traveled to Rome,1
Alexandria and Athens;2 while in Athens he probably attended the lectures
of Ammonius,3 who influenced his adoption of Platonism.4 However, he
spent most of his life in his hometown of Chaeronea, where he later founded
a sort of philosophical school or academy in which family, friends and pupils
could meet and discuss philosophical issues. Due to his social provenance
and education, he developed a rich political career5 and social life in which
he was acquainted with most of the prominent political and cultural figures
of the period.6 He is therefore a first-rate witness to the cultural life of late
antiquity.
1 See C.P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford 1971) and S.C.R. Swain, “Plutarch, Plato,
Athens, and Rome”, in J. Barnes & M. Griffith (eds), Philosophia Togata, II: Plato and Aristotle
at Rome (Oxford 1997) 165–187.
2 K. Ziegler, “Plutarchos”, RE, XXI (1951) 636–962 at 653–657 in his overview of Plutarch’s
travels, he points out (653) that his testimony is essential for our knowledge of the history
and topography of ancient Athens.
3 See Plu., De E 385B; 387F; C.P. Jones, “The Teacher of Plutarch”, HSCPh 71 (1967)
205–213; J. Whittaker, “Ammonius on the Delphic E”, CQ 19 (1969) 185–192; H. Dörrie, “Die
Stellung Plutarchs im Platonismus seiner Zeit”, in R.B. Palmer & R. Hammerton-Kelly (eds),
Philomathes. Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan (The Hague
1971) 36–56; P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen, I (Berlin-New York 1973) 18–28;
J.M. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 (Ithaka 1996 [1977])
189–192; R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques (Paris 1989) 164–165; B. Puech,
“Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque”, ANRW II 33.6 (1992) 4831–4893 at 4831–4893.
4 However, Plutarch seems to have left the Academy rather early, which H. Dörrie, “Der
Platonismus in der Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte der frühen Kaisezeit”, in Platonica minora
(Munich 1976) 166–210 at 183, traces back to Plutarch’s fundamental disagreement with some
of the main tenets of Platonism, such as his literal reading of the Timaeus which implied
his view that the cosmos was created after time, on which C. Froidefrond commented,
“Plutarque et le Platonisme”, ANRW II.36.1 (1987) 184–243 at 189–197. See further Dörrie, “Die
Stellung Plutarchs”, 36–56.
5 Ziegler, “Plutarchos”, 657–659.
6 Ziegler, “Plutarchos”, 666–696 and Puech, “Prosopographie des amis de Plutarque”,
4831–4893.
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1. Plutarch and the Philosophical Discourse
Plutarch’s testimony is essential to reconstructing and understanding the
philosophical and religious worlds of late antiquity. Even if he is not always
cherished as a philosopher by his readers,7 Plutarch plays a key role in the
history of ancient philosophy, both as an active part of the philosophical dis-
cussion taking place in his time and as a more detached observer of other
important events. In fact, he is credited as the most important Middle Pla-
tonist author,8 not only for the bulk of his philosophical production—more
than half of his recorded works in the Catalogue of Lamprias are devoted
to philosophical matters—but also for the extensive influence he exerted
on both Middle and Neoplatonic authors. The copious quotes or allusions
to his person and work in antiquity bear witness to his central importance
in the philosophical map of antiquity: Neopythagoreans, Middle Platonists,
Neoplatonists and Christians alike frequently appealed to his authority.9
Plutarch’s works are enormously important to the history of ancient phi-
losophy. First, his testimony is essential to understanding the development
of Platonism in the first centuries of the era. Indeed, his relationship with the
Academy, his version of Platonism, his role in Middle Platonism, his contri-
bution to or his evidence regarding the formation of the typically Middle
7 This is valid for both his ancient and modern readers. Thus, for example, Neoplatonists
such as Proclus who were scandalized by his view of the origins of the cosmos, mostly
viewed Plutarch as an historian, and in this line, Dillon, The Middle Platonists describes
him as “a litterateur and antiquarian”. See contra, F. Brenk, “An Imperial Heritage: The
Religious Spirit of Plutarch”, ANRW II.36.1 (1987) 248–349; and Froidefond, “Plutarque et
le Platonisme”, 233. A middle point may be found in Dörrie, “Der Platonismus”, 184, which
distinguishes the ancient from the modern perception of the sense in which Plutarch’s work
may be called “philosophical”. While from a modern perspective only the treatises against
Epicureans and Stoics are philosophical, from an ancient perspective almost every work of
his literary production might be considered philosophical: “Im antiken Sinne is freilich alles
philosophisch, was Plutarch aufzeichnete—philosophisch darum, weil aus den zahlreichen
einzelnen Beobachtungen, die sich auf Phänomene der Natur und der Literatur beziehen,
wieder und wieder Schlüsse auf das hinter ihnen Verborgene gezogen werden, etc”. See in
this volume the chapter by G. Roskam, 85–100, esp. 98–99.
8 M. Baltes, “Plutarch of Chaeronea. III. Philosophical Work. A. Education”, in “Plutar-
chus”, Brill’s New Pauly. Antiquity volumes edited by: Hubert Cancik and Helmuth Schneider.
Brill Online, 2012. Reference. University of Groningen. 24 May 2012 http://referenceworks
.brillonline.com/entries/brill-s-new-pauly/plutarchus-e928690.
9 R. Hirzel, Plutarch (Leipzig 1912) is still the best study on Plutarch’s reception; Ziegler,
“Plutarchos”, 947–962; for the influence of his ethical and theological writings on early Chris-
tianity, see H.D. Betz (ed.), Plutarch’s Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature (Lei-
den 1975) and idem (ed.), Plutarch’s Ethical Writings and Early Christian Literature (Leiden
1978).
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Platonic lore as a prelude to Neoplatonism10 and his participation from a
Platonic perspective in the interschool philosophical polemics of the time
are all precious elements both for the reconstruction of Middle Platonism
as such and for the assessment of its relationship with the other philosoph-
ical schools. The marked religious character of his approach to philosophy,
which he shares with numerous Middle Platonists, has also helped scholars
to better understand the characteristic confluence of religion and philoso-
phy in the first centuries of the era.11
But his philosophical interests went far beyond the strict borders of his
school; he observed many other philosophical groups. As is also the case
with other Middle Platonists, Aristotle enjoys a special status in the work
of Plutarch, who also addressed the Presocratics,12 Socrates,13 Cyrenaeans,
Stoa14 and Epicureanism,15 usually providing exceptional or unique echoes
10 R.M. Jones, The Platonism of Plutarch (Menasha 1916); H. Dörrie, “Le platonisme de
Plutarque”, in Actes du VIIIe Congrès de l’Association Guillaume Budé, Paris, 5–10 avril 1968
(Paris 1969) 519–530; idem, “Die Stellung Plutarchs im Platonismus”; Froidefond, “Plutarque
et le platonisme”; D. Tsekourakis, “Pythagoreanism or Platonism and Ancient Medicine? The
Reasons for Vegetarianism in Plutarch’s Moralia”, ANRW II.36.1 (1987) 366–393; P.L. Donini,
“Science and Metaphysics: Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism in Plutarch’s On the
Face in the Moon”, in J.M. Dillon & A.A. Long (eds), The Question of Eclecticism (Berkeley–
Los Angeles 1988) 15–33; idem, “Plutarco e la rinascita del platonismo”, in G. Cambiano
– L. Canfora & D. Lanza, Lo spazio letterario della Grecia antica I.3 (Rome 1994) 35–60;
idem, “L’eredità accademica e I fondamenti del platonismo in Plutarco”, in M. Barbanti –
G. Giardina & P. Manganaro, Henosis kai Philia. Unione e amicizia. Ommagio a Francesco
Romano (Catania 2003) 247–273; J. Opsomer, In Search of the Truth: Academic Tendencies in
Middle Platonism (Brussels 1998); idem, “The Place of Plutarch in the History of Platonism”,
in P. Volpe Cacciatore & F. Ferrari (eds), Plutarco e la cultura della sua età. Atti del X Convegno
plutarcheo, Fisciano–Paestum, 27–29 ottobre 2005 (Naples 2007) 281–310.
11 On Plutarch’s characteristic mixture of philosophy and religion, see Jones, The Pla-
tonism of Plutarch, 23; R. Flacelière, “Plutarque et la Pythie”, REG 56 (1943) 72–111 at 110–111;
D. Babut, Plutarque et le stoïcisme (Paris 1969) 368; F.E. Brenk, “From Mysticism to Mysti-
cism. The Religious Development of Plutarchus of Chaeronea”, SBL Seminar Papers 1 (1975)
193–198.
12 Eus., PE 1.8.1–12, attributes Plutarch a florilegium of philosophers, from which he ex-
tracts his overview of Presocratics such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes,
Democritus, Parmenides, Zeno of Elea and others. See Ziegler, “Plutarchos”, 768.
13 J. Opsomer, Searchers of the Truth (Leuven 1999) 127–162.
14 Plutarch wrote, according to Ziegler, “Plutarchos”, 753–761, eight or nine specific trea-
tises against the Stoics, of which two are preserved completely (De Stoic. repugn. and Adv.
Stoic.), although criticism against the Stoa can be found passim. See J.P. Hershbell, “Plutarch
and Stoicism”, ANRW II.36.5 (1992) 3336–3352.
15 Also, Plutarch seems to have written eight treatises against Epicureans, of which only
three are preserved (Adv. Col., Non poss., An recte dictum); Ziegler, “Plutarchos”, 761–767; See
Hershbell, “Plutarch and Epicureanism”, 3353–3383.
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of theories and viewpoints. His testimony has been essential for the trans-
mission of innumerable fragments from the Stoics and Epicurus.16
Take for example the character, development and influence of Aris-
totelian philosophy in antiquity. On the level of detail and anecdote, for
example, Plutarch’s Life of Sulla17 includes the probably legendary story,18
also recorded in slightly different terms by Strabo,19 of how the manuscripts
of the Corpus aristotelicum ended up in a cellar in the city of Scepsis. For
centuries, this story provided a plausible explanation for the decline of the
Lyceum after Aristotle’s death, which was already noticed in antiquity.20
According to this story, the books were first inherited by Theophrastus
and then bequeathed to Neleus of Scepsis, who took them from Athens to
Scepsis when he returned to his native city. The books were gravely dam-
aged in Scepsis because Neleus’ descendants—careless and illiterate peo-
ple, according to Plutarch—apparently hid them in a cellar to keep them
from being taken to Pergamum Library, and they remained there for around
two centuries.
Even if apocryphal, for centuries this story also explained the revival of
Aristotelianism in the first centuries ce. Plutarch described how Sulla, who
arrived at Piraeus in 86bc, seized the library of the recently dead Apellicon
of Teos21—who had since acquired the Corpus aristotelicum—and took it
to Rome. It is here that the renowned grammarian Tyrannion of Amisus
finally repaired and edited the books and apparently provided copies to
Andronicos of Rhodos, on the basis of which this philosopher prepared an
edition of Aristotle’s works around 60bc.22
16 A quick look to the major editions of both Stoics and Epicurus immediately reveals that
Plutarch’s writings were a major source for the fragments of the philosophers.
17 Plu., Sulla 26.
18 See H.B. Gottschalk, “Notes on the Wills of the Peripatetic Scholarchs”, Hermes 100
(1972) 314–342.
19 See Str. 13.68.
20 As commented upon by Cic., De fin. 5.5.13; Tusc. 4.5.9.
21 See I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition (Göteborg 1957) 375, 382;
Gottschalk, “Notes on the Wills”, 335–342; Moraux, Der Aristotelismus I, 18; H.B. Gottschalk,
“Aristotelian Philosophy in the Roman World from the time of Cicero to the End of the
Second Century”, ANRW II.36.1 (1987) 1079–1174 at 1083–1087; and more recently H. Lindsay,
“Strabo on Apellicon’s Library”, RhM 140 (1997) 290–298.
22 On this issue, see the thorough analysis of Moraux, Der Aristotelismus I, 1–94, who
compares the testimonies of Strabo and Plutarch and critically analyzes the contents of their
information and, more recently, Gottschalk, “Aristotelian Philosophy”, 1083–1097.
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On a more fundamental level, however, Plutarch’s oeuvre as a whole
is especially valuable for the assessment of the general character of Aris-
totelian philosophy in antiquity and for particular inquiries about some
of the numerous aspects of Aristotle’s thought that remain obscure.23 As
has been pointed out, the fact that Plutarch was deeply interested in Aris-
totle is obvious because up to four titles of his works in the Catalogue of
Lamprias are concerned with Aristotelian philosophy.24 However, as in the
cases of the Stoics and Epicureans, not only specific works but the whole
Plutarchean corpus provides testimony of this interest. Admittedly, the last
quarter of the twentieth century saw some attempts to qualify Plutarch’s
knowledge of Aristotle as “indirect”. Since, excluding some exoteric works,
Plutarch rarely quotes the philosopher, some scholars affirmed that he may
have only known Aristotle through intermediate works.25 Recent years have
seen a renewed assessment of Plutarch’s wide and direct knowledge of Aris-
totle’s exoteric and esoteric works.26
One of these scholars is A.P. Bos, whose study in the present volume,
“Plutarch on the Sleeping Soul and the Waking Intellect and Aristotle’s Dou-
ble Entelechy Concept”, affirms that Plutarch’s corpus allows us to assess
the extensive influence of Aristotle’s published and unpublished writings.27
In this study and in other previous works,28 Bos also asserts that Plutarch’s
23 See G. Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Anti-
ochus to Porphyry (Oxford 2006) chapter 2 “Plutarch”.
24 The titles of these works are Lecture on the Ten Categories (n. 192), Aristotle’s Topics
(n. 56), On the Fifth Substance (n. 44) and On Theophrastus’ Πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς piολιτικά (n. 52–
53). However, the existence of the second and third treatises has been challenged by E. Zeller,
Die Philosophie der Griechen, III 2, 180 note 1; F.H. Sandbach, Plutarch’s Moralia, XV (London–
Cambridge 1969), 6–12 ; idem, “Plutarch and Aristotle”, ICS 7 (1982) 207–232 at 212. See, on this
issue, Gottschalk, “Aristotelian Philosophy”, 1146–1147.
25 See Düring, Aristotle, 354–355; Sandbach, “Plutarch and Aristotle”; P.L. Donini, Tre studi
sull’Aristotelismo nel II secolo D.C. (Turin 1974) 64–80; idem, “Lo scetticismo accademico,
Aristotele e l’unità della tradizione platonica secondo Plutarco”, in G. Cambiano (ed.), Sto-
riografia endossografia nella filosofia antica (Turin 1986) 214–216. Contra see Karamanolis,
Plato and Aristotle, 90.
26 See Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle, chapter 2.
27 See below, this volume, 25–42. See also C. Santaniello, “Traces of the Lost Aristotle in
Plutarch”, in A. Pérez Jiménez et al., Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles (Madrid 1999), 629–641. Also
see the studies by A.P. Bos mentioned in notes 28 and 29.
28 See, for example, A.P. Bos, “Plutarch’s Testimony to an Earlier Explanation of Aristotle’s
Definition of the Soul”, in Pérez Jiménez et al., Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles, 535–548; A.P. Bos,
“The Distinction between ‘Platonic’ and ‘Aristotelian’ Dualism, Illustrated from Plutarch’s
Myth in De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet”, in A. Pérez Jiménez & F. Casadesús Bordoy (eds),
Estudios sobre Plutarco. Misticismo y Religiones Mistéricas en la Obra de Plutarco (Madrid-
Malaga 2001) 57–70.
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testimony is essential to disproving the developmental view of Aristotle’s
thought that reigned in the twentieth century due to the influence of
W. Jaeger and F.J.C.J. Nuyens.29 As a matter of fact, Plutarch affirms the fun-
damental unity of Aristotle’s published and unpublished works, showing30
that there was no contradiction or opposition between the views Aristotle
explored in dialogues such as the Eudemus, Protrepticos or On Philosophy
and the theories he more systematically exposed in the lectures contained
in the corpus. The analysis of particular Aristotelian echoes in the works of
Plutarch provides enough material to support this view.
This is particularly the case in Bos’ revision and redefinition of Aristotle’s
definition of the soul. Taking the myth of a “dreaming Kronos” at the end of
Plutarch’s De facie31 as a starting point, Bos engages in a far-reaching analysis
of Aristotle’s view of the soul as a double entelechy.32 After reviewing Aris-
totle’s famous definition of the soul as the “first entelechy of a natural body
which potentially possesses life and is organikon”, Bos shows that the “nat-
ural body” is nothing but the vital heat, which Aristotle frequently referred
to in a variety of ways, and that it serves the soul as an instrument for its
typical psychical functions.33 The term organikon in the quoted definition
should therefore not be translated as “equipped with organs” but rather as
“serving as an instrument”, a translation for which an interesting passage of
Plutarch’s Platonic Questions also provides good support.34
In order to explain in which way the soul is the entelechy of this natural
body, Bos launches a full analysis of the double sense with which “entelechy”
is used in On the Soul 2.1, which shows that Aristotle conceived of the soul
as an entelechy in a double way: when described as “asleep” the soul is seen
as forming a unity with its instrumental natural body; when the intellect
is referred to as “waking entelechy” it is because it is free of any bodily
covering. This is the reason why it can be compared to the sailor who, after
arriving in a safe harbor, no longer needs his ship. These Aristotelian views,
which are generally traceable in Middle Platonic authors such as Philo
29 On the developmental interpretation due to both scholars, see A.P. Bos, The Soul and its
Instrumental Body. A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Living Nature (Leiden 2003)
13–17 and 17–20, respectively.
30 Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle, 92 n. 27, rightly affirms that Plutarch’s distinction
between esoteric and exoteric works in Vita Alexandri 6 does testify to his knowledge of
Aristotle’s work as a whole.
31 Plu., De fac. 941F.
32 See A.P. Bos, Cosmic and Meta-Cosmic Theology in Aristotle’s Lost Dialogues (Leiden
1989) 16–20 and idem, The Soul, 224, 331, 345.
33 See A.P. Bos, “Plutarch on the Sleeping Soul”, 30–38.
34 See Plu., Qu. Plat. 8, 1006D, with Bos, “Plutarch’s Testimony”, 536.
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or Alcinous,35 are notably present in Plutarch and influenced his double
theology, his view of a twofold death, the pneumatic vehicle of the soul and,
especially, the notion of the Sleeping (World) Soul,36 which clearly echoes
the conception of a sleeping and waking soul.37
Plutarch also interacted with the Stoa, especially about ethics, one of his
beloved subjects.38 A quick look at the works included in Moralia clearly
shows that of all the philosophical disciplines, ethics was the most cher-
ished by Plutarch39 and the name of the corpus already points to its mainly
ethical character. However, scholars have recently stressed the importance
of ethics in the Lives as well.40 Despite the centrality of ethics in Plutarch’s
oeuvre, it is only after K. Ziegler’s study41 that it began to receive special
attention.42 Indeed, the last years have seen a renewed interest in his eth-
ical works.43
35 See, for example, Philo, De opif. mund. 16–25; Abr. 60–72 with A.P. Bos, “Philo of
Alexandria a Platonist in the Image and Likeness of Aristotle”, StudPhilon 10 (1998) 66–86;
Alcinous, Didask. 162.24–166.14 with Bos, “Plutarch on the Sleeping Soul”, 39–41.
36 Plu., De fac. 940F; De an. procr. 1026E–F.
37 Bos, “Plutarch on the Sleeping Soul”, 39–40.
38 See an overview in Ziegler, “Plutarchos”, 768–803. In any case, 74 of the 227 works of
the Lamprias catalogue are concerned with ethical issues.
39 M. Baltes, “Plutarch of Chaeronea. III Philosophical Work”, in “Plutarchus”. See L. van
Hoof, Plutarch’s Practical Ethics (Oxford 2010) Published on Oxford Scholarship Online: Sep-
tember 2010. http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583263
.001.0001/acprof-9780199583263.
40 For the importance of morality in the Lives, see F. Frazier, Histoire et morale dans les Vies
parallèles de Plutarque (Paris 1996); C. Pelling, “The Moralism of Plutarch’s Lives”, in D. Innes
– H. Hine & C. Pelling (eds), Ethics and Rhetoric: Classical Essays for D. Russell on his Seventy-
Fifth Birthday (Oxford 1995) 205–220, [repr. in C. Pelling (ed.), Plutarch and History: Eighteen
Studies (London 2002) 237–251]; T.E. Duff, Plutarch’s Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice (Oxford
1999).
41 See Ziegler, “Plutarchos”, 636–637 under “popular philosophisch-ethische Schriften”.
Against this label due to Plutarch’s expected readership, see van Hoof, Plutarch’s Practical
Ethics, 11; see also C. Pelling, “What is Popular about Plutarch’s ‘Popular Philosophy’?”, in
G. Roskam & L. Van der Stockt (eds), Virtues for the People: Aspects of Plutarchan Ethics.
Plutarchea hypomnemata (Leuven 2011) 41–58.
42 See, in general, Jones, Plutarch and Rome; D.A. Russell, Plutarch (London 1973); J. Bou-
logne, Plutarque: Un aristocrate grec sous l’ occupation romaine (Lille 1994); and J. Sirinelli,
Plutarque de Chéronée (Paris 2000). See H.G. Ingenkamp, Plutarchs Schriften über die Heilung
der Seele (Bonn 1971) on Plutarch’s On the Control of Anger, On Talkativeness, On Curiosity,
On Compliancy, and On Praising Oneself Inoffensively; and D. Tsekourakis,ΟἱΛαικοφιλοσοφικές
piραγµατεῖες τοῦΠλουτάρχου. ᾽Η σχέση τους µὲ τὴ διατριβὴ καὶ µὲ ἄ αpiαραpiλήσια γραµµατειακὰ εἴδη
(Thessaloniki 1983); L. Van der Stockt, “Aspects of the Ethics and Poetics of the Dialogue in
the Corpus Plutarcheum”, in I. Gallo & C. Moreschini (eds), I generi letterari in Plutarco. Atti
del VIII Convegno plutarcheo, Pisa, 2–4 giugno 1999 (Naples 2000) 93–116.
43 Van Hoof, Plutarch’s Practical Ethics; See, in general, the whole volume published
by Roskam and Van der Stock, Virtues for the People, but especially the introduction by
8 lautaro roig lanzillotta
In ethics, Plutarch’s point of departure is clearly Platonic-Aristotelian.
To begin with, he generally endorsed Plato’s view of the soul, exposed in
the Republic and the Timaeus as consisting of rational, spirited and passion-
ate parts. However, Plutarch more closely followed Aristotle’s philosophy
in allotting the two latter parts to an irrational part that resulted in the
bipartition into rational and irrational halves.44 His view of the passions,
consequently, was also clearly Platonic-Aristotelian, since he conceived of
them as arising in the irrational part of the soul when rationality appears to
have lost control of the soul complex. On Moral Virtue, for example, he even
distinguishes between practical and theoretical virtue on the basis that the
former exclusively deals with the irrational part of the soul and with tam-
ing emotions. This, of course, implies his view of the passions as important
contributors to the tonus of the soul and of metriopatheia as the only way
to deal with passions in a proper way.45 In On Moral Virtue, Plutarch fre-
quently referred to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in order to assess his
view of virtue as a mesotes.46
Admittedly, his position is sometimes far from clear, often due to Plu-
tarch’s active involvement in the philosophical discussions of his time:
sometimes Plutarch purposefully used Stoic terminology to turn it polemi-
cally against them; other times, the lack of clarity results from the tradition
he is following, be it Stoic, Cynic or other. It is precisely this difficulty that
Angelo Becchi’s article on Plutarchean ethics, “The Doctrine of the Passions:
Plutarch, Posidonius and Galen”, intends to tackle. As a scholar with a pro-
found knowledge of Plutarch’s ethics, to which he has devoted numerous
studies,47 Becchi attempts to determine Plutarch’s position on ethics more
G. Roskam & L. Van der Stock, “Efficiency and Effectiveness in Plutarch’s Broadcasting
Ethics”, 7–16 and the papers by L. van Hoof, “Plutarch’s Diet Ethics Precepts of Healthcare
Between Diet and Ethics”, 109–132; H.M. Martin, “Plutarch’s Morality: Arete Tyche and Non-
Consequentialism”, 133–150; J. Opsomer, “Virtue, Fortune and Happiness in Theory and Prac-
tice”, 151–174; and A.G. Nikolaidis, “Plutarch’s ‘Minor Ethics’: Some Remarks on De Garrulitate,
De Curiositate, and De Vitioso Pudore”, 205–222.
44 See, for example, Plu., Qu. Plat. 9, 1007E; De virt. mor. 442A.
45 Plu., De virt. mor. 451B.
46 Plu., De virt. mor. 444C–445A. See, in general, Dillon, Middle Platonists, 192–198.
47 See, for example, F. Becchi, Plutarco, La virtù etica (Naples 1999); “Animadversiones
Plutarcheae: De cohibenda ira et De ira”, Lexis 20 (2002) 133–142; “La pensée morale de Plu-
tarque et le Perì orgès: une nouvelle interprétation”, in J. Ribeiro Ferreira & D. Leão (eds),
Os fragmentos de Plutarco e a recepção da sua obra (Coimbra 2003) 89–109; “La dottrina del
telos nel pensiero e nell’opera di Plutarco”, in M. Jufresa, F. Mestre, P. Gómez & P. Gilabert
(eds), Plutarco a la seva època: Paideia i Societat. Actas del VIII Simposio Internacional de la
Sociedad Española de Plutarquistas. Barcelona 6–8 de Noviembre de 2003 (Barcelona 2005)
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clearly. As he affirms, Plutarch’s ethical affiliation was mainly that of a
Platonist48 and as such he regularly adopted a clear anti-Stoic attitude.
Despite this, it is possible to find the influence of Stoic doctrines in his work,
an issue which, as Becchi rightly claims, still needs a satisfying explanation.
This is especially noteworthy in regard to the passions, where we find
strictly Platonic positions beside notions of a clear Stoic matrix: even as
he openly criticized Chrysippus’ view of passion as a mistake, Plutarch
nevertheless appears to have combined a Platonic view of affections with
the Stoic doctrine of διαστροφή, which explained how due to weakness
(ἀσθένεια) of the mind,49 passions may appear to drive people to vice. Indeed,
Plutarch attacked his contemporaries for being in a state of ‘mental poverty’
(piενία ψυχική) brought about by their false opinions; allowing first for bad
habits, this state forms at the end a second nature that prevents people
from being free from error. According to Becchi, Plutarch did not actually
contradict himself: in line with Posidonius but anticipating Galen, Plutarch
asserted that ignorance and bad habits may sometimes incline to passions
even those people who lack violent passionate impulses and have a sound
rational part of the soul. Becchi’s analysis of numerous passages from Mora-
lia and Lives provides an overview of Plutarch’s view of passions as “affec-
tions causing pain and fear in men not prepared by reason to bear bad
luck”. In fact, lack of philosophical training may cause inconsistencies and
anomalies both in people with good natural qualities and in great charac-
ters. Wisdom should therefore be revered as most important and perfect art,
as the culmination of both good reputation and all human endeavors.
The influence of the external world on the individual’s soul also plays an
important role in Raúl Caballero’s chapter on the “Adventitious Motions of
the Soul (Plu., De Stoic. repugn. 23, 1045B–F) and the Controversy between
Aristo of Chios and the Middle Academy”. Incidentally, it also places us
at a general level in front of the inherent hermeneutic difficulties related
to Plutarch’s testimony of the philosophical discussion and interschool
199–208; “Éthique et régime alimentaire dans les écrits plutarquiens de psychologie animale”,
in J. Boulogne (ed.), Les Grecs de l’ Antiquité et les animaux. Le cas remarquable de Plutarque. V
Réseau international de recherche et de formation à la recherche “Plutarque”, Lille 12–13 Dicem-
bre 2003 (Lille 2005) 145–155; “Apatheia e metriopatheia in Plutarco”, in A. Casanova (ed.),
Plutarco e l’età ellenistica. Atti del Convegno internazionale di Studi, Firenze 23–24 Settembre
2004 (Firenze 2005) 385–400.
48 See below, this volume, 43–53 and F. Becchi, “Plutarco tra platonismo e aristotelismo:
la filosofia come paideia dell’anima”, in Pérez Jiménez et al., Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles,
25–43.
49 See, for example, Plu., De tranq. an. 468D; for the Stoic view, see Posid., fr. 169.77–117
E.-K.
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polemics in which he took an active part and which, as we already noted,
often appeared to be “deformed” due to the context of the tradition in which
his discussion took place. Caballero’s article provides a good example of
Plutarch’s combination of an anti-Stoic attitude with his rhetorical strate-
gies to attack them.
In De Stoicorum repugnantiis 23, Plutarch referred to Chrysippus’ crit-
icism of some philosophers who advocated the “adventitious faculty or
motion of the soul” (ἡ ἐpiελευστικὴ δύναµις / κίνησις τῆς ψυχῆς), a kind of
motion taking place in the commanding part of the soul that has the power
to release impulses from external causes. Of the three current interpreta-
tions of “these philosophers” (Stoic, Epicurean and Academic), Caballero
regards the third as the most consistent since it fits with what is known
about the criteria of action described by Arcesilaus and his disciples (Mid-
dle Academy) in their controversy with Zeno and his disciples of the early
Stoa. Building upon previous work,50 Caballero argues that Chrysippus was
not attacking Aristo of Chios and his disciples, who introduced the idea of
ἐpiελεύσεις (occurrentia), but Arcesilaus and/or his followers of the Middle
Academy, who probably adopted their terminology for dialectical purposes,
which was a usual Academic method in their debates with the Stoics.
With Brenk’s article on “Plutarch and ‘Pagan Monotheism’ ”, we move to
a cardinal subject in Plutarch’s work, namely his philosophical monothe-
ism, a theme on which Plutarch has had an enormous lasting influence.
The first decade of the twenty-first century produced a large number of
important publications: aside from traditional studies focusing on Jewish-
Christian monotheism alone and the way in which Christianity did or did
not inherit Jewish monotheism51—showing an interest at the most in Near-
Eastern precedents52—numerous recent investigations claim the need to
50 R. Caballero, “La doctrina de las ἐpiελεύσεις y la libertad de indiferencia: de Aristón de
Quíos a Arcesilao (Plut., Stoic. rep. 23, 1045 B–F)”, in F. Frazier & D.F. Leão (eds), Tychè et
Pronoia. La marche du monde selon Plutarque (Coimbra 2010) 13–38 at 13–15; idem, “Entre la
necesidad del destino y la libertad del átomo: el clinamen epicúreo y la libertad de indiferen-
cia (Plut., Stoic. rep. 23, 1045B–F)”, in A. Pérez Jiménez & I. Calero Secall (eds), ∆ῶρον Μνηµο-
σύνης. Miscelánea de estudios ofrecidos a Mª Ángeles Durán López (Zaragoza 2011) 69–82.
51 See, for example, the collection of articles published by L.T. Stuckenbruck & W.W.S.
North (eds), Early Jewish and Christian Monotheism (London–New York 2004); W. Weiß,
Der eine Gott und das gemeinschaftliche Mahl: Inklusion und Exklusion biblischer Vorstellun-
gen von Mahl und Gemeinschaft im Kontext antiker Festkultur (Neukirchen-Vluyn 2011) and
U. Mell (ed.), Der eine Gott und die Geschichte der Völker: Studien zur Inklusion und Exklusion
im biblischen Monotheismus (Neukirchen–Vluyn 2011).
52 Thus the volume edited by B. Pongratz-Leisten (ed.), Reconsidering the Concept of
Revolutionary Monotheism (Winona Lake 2011).
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widen the scope of research53 to include all late antique monotheistic mani-
festations54 and thus provide a sound context in which the success of Jewish-
Christian monotheism may be plausibly explained. And indeed, ever since
the publication of the collection of articles prepared by P. Athanissiadis and
M. Frede, Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity,55 research into paganism has
received growing attention.56
This is the approach we find in the article by Brenk, a specialist on
Plutarch’s monotheistic traits. This issue has received important attention
in recent years and studies have underlined both the Platonic context in
which Plutarch’s view of God should be placed57 and the characteristic way
in which his monotheistic inclinations are presented.58 More specifically,
scholars have focused on the characteristics of this divinity,59 namely his
unity and personality.60 In line with Plutarch’s view that philosophical truth
transcends ethnic boundaries,61 Brenk reconstructs the monotheistic soil on
which Christianity was going to develop, taking Akhenaten’s monotheistic
enterprise in the second half of the second millenniumbc as a starting point.
After briefly reviewing On Isis and Osiris, the text in which Plutarch reduced
the divine to one God, Brenk surveys those Plutarchean texts that may have
exerted a major influence on Christian monotheism. On the Generation of
the Soul in the Timaeus is one of these texts, since it describes the activity
of a divinity crafting the world in a technomorphic cosmogonical model
similar to that of Christianity.62 The E at Delphi, however, is the text in which
53 D. Staudt, Der eine und einzige Gott: monotheistische Formeln im Urchristentum und ihre
Vorgeschichte bei Griechen und Juden (Göttingen 2012).
54 See, for example, E. Bons & T. Legrand, Le monothéisme biblique: évolution, contextes et
perspectives (Paris 2011).
55 P. Athanassiadi & M. Frede (eds), Pagan Monotheism in Late Antiquity (Oxford–New
York 1999).
56 See, for example, R.G. Kratz & H. Spieckermann (eds), Götterbilder, Gottesbilder, Welt-
bilder: Polytheismus und Monotheismus in der Welt der Antike (Tübingen 2006); S. Mitchell &
P. van Nuffelen, One God: Pagan Monotheism in the Roman Empire (Cambridge 2010).
57 F. Ferrari, “Der Gott Plutarchs und der Gott Platons”, in R. Hirsch-Luipold (ed.), Gott und
die Götter bei Plutarch. Götter Bilder – Gottesbilder – Weltbilder (Berlin–New York 2005) 13–
26; F.E. Brenk, “Plutarch’s Middle Platonic God: About to Enter (Or Remake) the Academy”,
in Hirsch-Luipold, Gott und die Götter, 27–49.
58 Especially interesting in this line is the study by Hirsch-Luipold, “Der eine Gott bei Philo
von Alexandrien und Plutarch”, in idem, Gott und die Götter, 141–168.
59 Hirsch-Luipold, “Der eine Gott”, 152–161.
60 See previous note and notably D. Massaro, “To theion e o theos in Plutarco”, in Gallo,
Plutarco e la religione, 337–355.
61 Brenk, “Plutarch and Pagan Monotheism”, 73–84 at 73–74.
62 The distinction between the technomorphic vs the biomorphic cosmogonical models
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Plutarch elevated the figure of Apollo above the pantheon—provided that
the author is not echoing Ammonius’ position rather than stating his own—
in describing him in the famous fashion as a-polus or a-polla ‘not many’.63
In the author’s view a comparison between Plutarch’s monotheistic traits
and Christian monotheism shows interesting similarities since they both
constructed an idea of a supreme God by combining ethnographic studies
to achieve a “true concept” of God and a philosophical well-defined view of
God.
As already stated, Plutarch’s influence on posterity has been extensive.
Beside his views on ethics, his echo of the interschool polemics and the
development of his philosophical monotheism, his testimony has also been
crucial to the understanding of numerous famous figures of antiquity, nota-
bly Alcibiades, whose noxious attitude towards his native city was used
in later tradition to attack the value and integrity of Platonic philosophy.
Geert Roskam’s article on “Socrates and Alcibiades: a Notorious σκάνδαλον
in the Later Platonist Tradition”, approaches their famous relationship from
a political and an ethical perspective. As to the former, it briefly surveys
the favorable and negative approaches to Socrates’ double indictment for
impiety and for corrupting the youth, evaluating the extent to which the
second charge may not be alluding (even if indirectly) to the philosopher’s
association with influential statesmen such as Critias and Alcibiades. The
ethical aspect comes to the fore when considering Socrates’ influence on
Alcibiades. Indeed Socrates’ view that no one willingly goes wrong and the
effectiveness of his educative and philosophical enterprise seemed to be
blatantly refuted in the person of Alcibiades: if he was brilliant himself and
had in Socrates the best possible teacher, how is it possible that his behavior
deviated so much from the expected norm and caused so much harm to his
native city?
This issue, of course, raised interesting philosophical questions that were
amply dealt with in an early period of antiquity (e.g. Plato, Xenophon,
is due to Burkert, apud J.N. Bremmer, “Canonical and Alternative Creation Myths in Ancient
Greece”, in G. van Kooten (ed.), The Creation of Heaven and Earth: Re-interpretations of
Genesis I in the Context of Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, Christianity, and Modern Physics
(Leiden 2005) 73–96. On Plutarch’s De animae procr., see L. Baldi, Plutarco. La generazione
dell’anima nel Timeo (Naples 2002).
63 See J. Whittaker, “Ammonius on the Delphic E”, CQ 19 (1969) 185–192 [= Studies in
Platonism and Patristic Thought (London 1984) ch. V]; see also idem, “Plutarch, Platonism
and Christianity”, in H.J. Blumenthal & R.A. Markus (eds), Neoplatonism and Early Christian
Thought. Essays in Honour of A.H. Armstrong (London 1981) 50–63 [= Studies in Platonism,
ch. XXVIII, at 53–54].
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Aeschines of Sphettus or Polycrates the Sophist) and continued to be rel-
evant at a later time. As Roskam shows, Plutarch and Proclus provided tes-
timony to the interest of later Platonists and the similarities between their
approaches to the topic shows the extent to which Plutarch was read in
antiquity. The differences in their approaches, however, make clear that
Proclus mainly viewed Plutarch as a historian, which seems to be supported
by the fact that he never quoted him by name.64
The last chapter of the philosophical section, “Salt in the Holy Water:
Plutarch’s Quaestiones Naturales in Michael Psellus’ De omnifaria doctrina”
by Michiel Meeusen, explores medieval Platonic scholar Psellus’ reaction
to Plutarch. In his work De omnifaria doctrina, Psellus addressed scientific
problems from Plutarch’s Quaestiones Naturales, notably those concerning
physics and physiology. Meeusen focuses on the (mainly Platonic) sources
of the first redaction of this work, with a view to focusing on the problems
taken from Plutarch’s Quaestiones Naturales. He stresses the importance of
a detailed study of the work even from a purely textual perspective, since
Psellus’ interventions not only allow us to understand his working methods,
but also provide insight into how he understood and dealt with Quaestiones
Naturales.
2. Plutarch and the Religious Discourse
Plutarch’s role in the history of ancient religiosity is as central as the one he
plays in the history of ancient philosophy. One may even contest the separa-
tion of philosophy and religion in his work, claiming that such a distinction
reveals itself to be artificial.65 This idea may perhaps also be extrapolated
to the whole historical period of late antiquity, in which the confluence
between philosophy and religion or religion and philosophy marks off spiri-
tuality. In his comparative study of Philo and Plutarch’s ideas of god, Rainer
Hirsch-Luipold suggestively affirms that the comparison between both Pla-
tonists reveals a complete blend of religion and philosophy that is charac-
terized by three distinctive elements:
64 G. Roskam, “Socrates and Alcibiades: a Notorious σκάνδαλον in the Later Platonist
Tradition”, 85–100.
65 On Plutarch’s comingling of religion and philosophy, see in general the volume edited
by Gallo, Plutarco e la religione and particularly the articles by W. Burkert, “Plutarco: Reli-
giosità personale e teologia filosofica”, in Gallo, Plutarco e la religione, 11–28 and Moreschini,
“Religion e filosofia in Plutarco”, ibid. 29–48.
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a) the combination of religious spirituality with philosophical specula-
tion;
b) the allegorical interpretation of religious traditions; and
c) an emphasis on the immateriality and transcendence of a divinity
whose unity and interaction with the world are facts.66
This combination of elements, foreseen by both authors, was rather wide-
spread from the second century onwards. Taking its presence as a touch-
stone, we may widen the group to include many other Middle Platonists
and Neopythagoreans as well as other authors such as those included in the
Corpus Hermeticum and the Nag Hammadi Library.67
The testimony of Plutarch also reveals itself to be essential for the assess-
ment of numerous general and particular religious issues, as with philosoph-
ical issues. The role and character of Dionysus in late antiquity is one exam-
ple: Orphism and Dionysianism occupy a prominent place in the works
of Plutarch’s Lives and Moralia.68 The relationship between Orphism and
Dionysianism in antiquity was given due attention by Ana Isabel Jiménez in
a previous work.69 In this volume, her chapter on “Iacchus in Plutarch” relies
66 See Hirsch-Luipold, “Der eine Gott”, 161–167, the section called “Religiöse Philosophie
and philosophische Religion als Grundzug der Philosophie- und Religionsgeschichte der
frühen Kaiserzeit”, in which (at 161) he affirms: “Dabei wird deutlich worden, dass die gängin-
gen Grenzziehungen zwischen Philosophie und Religion einerseits und zwischen jüdisch-
christlicher (religiöser) Tradition und griechischer (philosophischer) Tradition anderseits
verdecken, wie sehr das Verhältnis durch gegenseitige Beeinflussungen bestimmt ist, die
das Wesen mindestens eines Stranges des kaiserzeitlichen Platonismus ausmachen, der als
religiöse Philosophie zu verstehen ist”.
67 For the relationship between Plutarch and some of the Nag Hammadi texts, see L. Roig
Lanzillotta, “Plutarch of Chaeronea and the Gnostic Worldview: Middle Platonism and the
Nag Hammadi Library”, in J.M. Candau Morón – F.J. González Ponce & A.L. Chávez Reino
(eds), Plutarco como transmisor. Actas del X Simposio Internacional de la Sociedad española
de Plutarquistas. Sevilla, 12–14 de noviembre 2009 (Sevilla 2011) 401–417.
68 On Plutarch and Orphism, see G. Méautis, “Plutarque et l’ Orphisme”, in Mélanges
G. Glotz (Paris 1932) 575–585; R. Turcan, “Bona Dea et la Mere ineffable de Dionysus (Plut.,
Caes. 9)”, in D. Porte & J.P. N’eraudau (eds), Hommages a Henri Le Bonnier (Brussels 1988)
428–440; M. Pinnoy, “Plutarque et l’ orphisme”, AncSoc 21 (1990) 201–214; L. Brisson, “Orphée
et l’ orphisme a l’ époque impériale. Témoignages et interprétations philosophiques, de Plu-
tarque à Jamblique”, ANRW II.36.4 (1990) 2869–2931. For a recent and thorough analysis, see
especially A. Bernabé, “Plutarco e l’orfismo”, in Gallo, Plutarco e la religione, 63–104, with a
textual appendix including a complete list of all Plutarch’s passages referring to Orphism. On
Dionysus in Plutarch, see G. Cassadio, “Osiride in Grecia e Diniso in Egitto”, in Gallo, Plutarco
e la religione, 201–227.
69 On the differences, similarities and intersections between Orphism and Dionysism, see
the thorough analysis by A. Jiménez San Cristóbal, “Orfismo y Dionisismo”, in A. Bernabé &
F. Casadesús (eds), Orfeo y la tradición órfica. Un reencuentro (Madrid 2008) 697–727.
introduction 15
on Plutarch’s testimony to shed some light on an inveterate interpretation
related to the god, namely whether the name Iacchus originally referred to
an independent deity from Eleusinian circles that was later assimilated to
Dionysus or whether it is an epiclesis of the god.70 Numerous artistic and
literary testimonies assimilate both names and the scholarly literature on
the issue is far from reaching consensus. Jiménez’s approach to the subject
matter surveys sections of Plutarch’s Lives and describes the procession that
escorted Iacchus from Athens to Eleusis with a view to solving this hotly
debated issue.
The philosophical section provides a first approach to Plutarch’s the-
ology by analyzing his philosophical monotheism and framing his views
about the divine both in Platonism and in the wider context of late antique
monotheistic tendencies. As stated above, Plutarch mainly based his views,
as expressed in On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus and in The
E at Delphi, on Plato’s Timaeus. Plutarch’s reception and use of the lat-
ter also occupies a central place in the chapter by Lautaro Roig Lanzil-
lotta, “Plutarch’s Idea of God in the Religious and Philosophical Context
of Late Antiquity”. It is well known that in The Malice of Herodotus (857F–
858A), Plutarch rejected Herodotus’ motto piᾶν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες
and accused the historian of blasphemy and malice. According to the tra-
ditional interpretation, Plutarch was reacting against a view of the gods as
“utterly envious and always ready to confound us”. However, such an inter-
pretation clearly misses the point of Plutarch’s criticism: first of all, the tradi-
tional interpretation seems to rely on an over-interpretation of Herodotus’
conception of the divinity that interprets as “envious” (φθονερόν), which we
may perhaps rather translate as “avaricious, stingy”.71 In the second place,
for a thinker such as Plutarch who was so well versed in the Timaeus and
who had such a refined and elevated view of the divine, the attack on
Herodotus’ misconception of the divinity—and his labeling Herodotus nota
bene as blasphemous and malicious—must concern some more fundamen-
tal aspect of the divinity than the sheer attribution of envy to god.
70 See Ana Isabel Jiménez, “Iacchus in Plutarch”, 125–135; see esp. 125 notes 2 and 3 for the
numerous scholars for and against this assimilation.
71 See L. Roig Lanzillotta, “Plutarch’s Idea of God in the Religious and Philosophical
Context of Late Antiquity”, 137–150 and, in general idem, La envidia en el pensamiento griego.
De la época arcaica al helenismo (Diss. Universidad Complutense; Madrid 1997); see also
idem, “The So-called Envy of the Gods. Revisiting a Dogma of Ancient Greek Religion”, in
J. Dijkstra et al. (eds), Myths, Martyrs, and Modernity: Studies in the History of Religions in
Honour of Jan N. Bremmer (Leiden 2010) 75–93.
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Taking this passage from The Malice of Herodotus as a starting point,
Roig Lanzillotta illuminates numerous aspects of Plutarch’s role as an inter-
preter, a theologian and a philosopher. Comparing this work with other
Plutarchean passages that comment on the divine helps us to clarify both
Plutarch’s point of criticism and his view of the divinity. Plutarch’s views on
the divine should be placed in the context of the Middle Platonists’ recep-
tion of Timaeus 29E, the locus classicus for the definition of God’s good-
ness and his implicit creative activity. More specifically, his views should
be placed in the context of Middle Platonic theodicy that denied any divine
responsibility for the appearance of evil or imperfection in the realm of cre-
ation. In echoing and commenting upon Plato’s words, Middle Platonists
were mainly concerned with God’s creative impulse, the stainless good-
ness behind it and the impossibility of making him responsible for anything
imperfect that resulted from his activity.
The usefulness of Plutarch’s testimony for the reconstruction of the reli-
gious map of late antiquity, however, is not exhausted by the information
he transmitted as a detached observer. As already stated, his testimony is
especially valuable for the active part he played in the religious world he
described.72 This close relationship comes to the fore in Angelo Casanova’s
chapter, “Plutarch as Apollo’s Priest at Delphi”. Despite the numerous works
pondering Plutarch’s relationship with Apollo’s sanctuary at Delphi, the
Pythia, Delphic religion or Apollo,73 the fact is that Plutarch himself rarely
referred to his role as a priest of Apollo. However, in spite of his relative
silence about his office, there are a couple of Plutarchean places74 in which
the writer referred to it in passant. Casanova’s philological mastery extracts
all the information provided by the testimonies and, combining it with the
Delphic inscription Syll.3 829A, extrapolates this information in order to
illuminate a passage of The E at Delphi (385A), the obscurity of which has
led some scholars to amend the text.
Beside the interest of Plutarch’s testimony in the reconstruction of offi-
cial Greek religion, Moralia also attests to his interest in a more popular
72 See, on this issue, W. Burkert, “Religiosità personale”, passim.
73 See below, this volume, 151–157. See also Flacelière, “Plutarch e la Pythia”; for Plutarch
and Delphi, see Brenk, “The Religious Spirit”, 330–336; also see the three relevant studies
in the volume edited by Gallo, Plutarco e la religione: G. Sfameni Gasparro, “Plutarco e la
religion delfica. Il dio filosofo e il suo profeta” (157–188); F. Conca, “Osservazioni sulla lingua
e lo stile dei Dialoghi Delfici” (189–200); I. Chirassi Colombo, “Pythia e Sybilla. I problema
dell’atechnos mantiké in Plutarco” (429–447); see more recently, P.A. Stadter, “Plutarch and
Apollo of Delphi”, in Hirsch-Luipold, Gott und die Götter, 197–214.
74 See Plu., An sen. 792F and Qu. conv. 700E.
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kind of religiosity. Scholarly consensus finds that his attitude towards pop-
ular beliefs in general and to superstitions of all kinds—such as omens,
portents or evil daimones—in particular was rather reluctant75 since he
prided himself on his rationalism. However, the dichotomy of rational ver-
sus superstitious has been softened by recent studies.76 Plutarch’s On super-
stition, well known for his criticism of superstitious practices and beliefs,
ridicules omens, portents, dreams and belief in the torments of the after-
life. However, as has been pointed out, “when one reads his Lives and even
many of his Moralia one cannot help but feel that he reflects to an astound-
ing degree a certain complex of popular beliefs in his day”.77 In spite of
the criticism expressed elsewhere, Plutarch seems to have sometimes given
credence to the supernatural and Lives abundantly exploits the dramatic
power of premonitory events such as omens, portents, dreams and even
eclipses.
This contrast comes to the fore in Aurelio Pérez Jiménez’s chapter on
“Plutarch’s Attitude Towards Astral Biology”. Despite the fact that recent
studies affirm that Plutarch was critical of popular beliefs such as the sym-
bolism and influence of the stars on animals or humans,78 the study of
relevant Plutarchean texts shows that the Chaeronean’s views are more
nuanced than scholars have been ready to admit. It is true that his position
was generally rather rational and that he may have criticized superstitious
beliefs that claim human beings are dependent on the stars and planets.
However, as Pérez Jiménez shows, when astral biology seemed to be well
grounded in ancestral observation, Plutarch was more prone to give cre-
dence to those beliefs.
Another example of Plutarch’s inclination to deal with popular beliefs in
a rather positive way may be seen in his echo of the ancient superstition
75 On superstition, see H. Moellering, Plutarch on Superstition (Boston 1963) 165–173; on
the miraculous, B. Mackay, “Plutarch and the Miraculous”, in C.F.D. Moule (ed.), Miracles.
Studies in their Philosophy and History (London 1965) 93–113; and G.T. Smith, The Importance
of Miracle in the Religious Truth of Plutarch of Chaeronea (Diss. New York 1972). For his
hostility towards the belief in evil demons, see Brenk, “The Religious Spirit”, 277.
76 See R. Gordon, “Fear of Freedom? Selective Continuity in Religion During the Hellenis-
tic Period”, Didaskalos 4 (1972) 48–60, who relativised the view by E.R. Dodds, as expressed
in his The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley 1951). See also Brenk, “The Religious Spirit”,
260–261.
77 F.E. Brenk, “And to all the Sign Seemed Evil: Omens and Portents”, in idem, In Mist
Apparelled. Religious Themes in Plutach’s Moralia and Lives (Leiden 1977) 184–213.
78 See J. Hani, La religion Égyptienne dans la pensée de Plutarque (Paris 1976) and the
criticism expressed by Aurelio Pérez Jiménez in his chapter, 159–169.
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of the evil eye, belief in which was rather widespread in antiquity.79 Admit-
tedly, the question as to whether or not the evil eye should be considered
a superstition is not that simple. It seems evident that, from a modern per-
spective, such a “belief” is simple superstition, but it was not that clear from
an ancient perspective. Ever since Democritus, belief in the evil eye had
been given a “physical” explanation, the validity of which can be traced
up to the Middle Ages and the Renaissance.80 That the line between well-
founded belief (or even science) and superstition is rather tenuous can be
seen in the fact that what for us is simply Aberglaube was during centuries
past a rather solid piece of scientific theory.81 The chapter by Paola Volpe-
Cacciatore, “ ‘Cicalata sul fascino volgarmente detto jettatura’: Plutarch, Qu.
conv. 5.7”, provides a wide survey of beliefs about the evil eye and the power
ancients attributed to the look of the envious. The chapter begins with the
eighteenth-century study by N. Valletta, commented upon by B. Croce, in
order to focus on the discussion of the motif in Plutarch’s Table Talks. The
discussion shows that although Plutarch was reluctant to embrace popular
superstitions, he gave them some credence when they could be supported
by the opinions of the ancients.
With Delfim Leão’s chapter “The Eleusinian Mysteries and Political Tim-
ing in the Life of Alcibiades”, we move away from popular beliefs to focus on
Plutarch’s interest in ancient history and more specifically on the relation-
ship he saw between religious manifestations and political events. In his
interpretation, the Eleusinian Mysteries mirrored periods of political and
religious instability in Athenian society. Plutarch’s Life of Alcibiades pro-
vides an excellent example thereof as it shows that the Eleusinian Mysteries
were closely connected to the life and political career of this charismatic
statesman in two decisive moments: first, on the occasion of his process
for asebeia that determined his exile and second, during his triumphant
79 See, in general, S. Seligman, Der böse Blick und Verwandtes: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte
des Aberglaubens aller Zeiten und Völker (Berlin 1910).
80 S. Seligman, Die Zauberkraft des Auges und das Berufen: ein Kapitel aus der Geschichte
des Aberglaubens (The Hague 1985); see more recently Th. Rakoczy, Böser Blick, Macht
des Auges und Neid der Götter: eine Untersuchung zur Kraft des Blickes in der griechischen
Literatur (Tübingen 1996).
81 For the symbolism of the eye in antiquity, see M. Steinhart, Das Motiv des Auges in der
griechischen Bildkunst (Mainz 1995); for its reception in the Renaissance, see, for example,
Garcilaso de La Vega’s sonnet VIII that plays on the Democritean view that the atoms are
projected from the eyes of the envious, reaching the object of their envy (to describe the way
the sight of the beloved acts upon the lover). But see already Dante Alighieri, La Vita Nuova
19.70–73, “Degli occhi suoi, comme ch’ ella gli muova/ escono spirti d’amore infiammati/, che
fieron gli occhi a qual, che allor gli guati/ e pasan sì che ‘l cor ciascun ritrova”.
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return to Athens.82 The negative and positive roles, respectively, played by
the Eleusinian Mysteries on both occasions reflect the favor and resistance
Alcibiades enjoyed in Athenian society at different times of his life, reveal-
ing the extent to which religion and politics were interconnected during the
upheavals of Athenian history.
The blend of religion and philosophy we characterized above as being
part of late antique thought in general and of Philo and Plutarch in par-
ticular, comes to the fore in Rosario Scannapieco’s chapter “Μυστηριώδης
θεολογία: Plutarch’s Fr. 157 Sandbach between Cultural Traditions and Philo-
sophical Models”. The analysis of fr. 157 Sandbach is the starting point for a
wide-ranging study of Plutarch’s view of myth and his eclectic approach to
its interpretation. It shows Plutarch’s interest in the theme of conjugal love,
which was also present in his dialogue On Love and which also underlies
the Egyptian myth in On Isis and Osiris. The author uncovers close ideo-
logical connections between the texts by analyzing the rhetorico-formal
structures of the fragment in which Plutarch seems to have suggested a
mystico-religious interpretation of reality.
Plutarch’s testimony about the history of religions and, more specifically,
religious movements in the Mediterranean during the first centuries ce
is enormously important. He was a first-rate witness to early Christianity.
Though his testimony was mainly indirect, this is precisely what makes his
views so important for the reconstruction of the religious atmosphere at the
time of the emergence of Christianity. As has been pointed out, “the lifetime
of Plutarch, falling within the later first and early second century, coincides
with one of the most crucial moments in the history of human thought, in
that it was precisely during the lifetime of Plutarch that the new religion
of Christianity came into contact with the old and well-established world
of Greek philosophy. Thus the writings of Plutarch (…) permit us to access
the intellectual state of the Graeco-Roman world at the exact moment of
contact”.83
George van Kooten’s chapter, “A Non-Fideistic Interpretation of piίστις in
Plutarch’s Writings: the Harmony between piίστις and Knowledge”, explains
how Plutarch’s testimony can help us improve our understanding of early
Christianity. Van Kooten engages in a thorough study of Plutarch’s uses of
82 See below, this volume, 181–192. The charismatic political and social figure of Alcibiades
is also addressed by G. Roskam in chapter 5, 85–100.
83 J. Whittaker, “Plutarch, Platonism and Christianity”, in Blumenthal & Marus, Neopla-
tonism, 50–63 at 50.
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the terms piίστις and piιστεύειν in Moralia in order to show the need for a
better understanding of the notion of “belief” (piίστις) in both paganism and
Christianity. Comparison with Plutarch shows that it is incorrect to differen-
tiate between the many classical meanings of piίστις—which are allowed to
vary depending on the context—and a specific theological, Pauline mean-
ing.
The need to contextualize the Christian understanding of piίστις has also
been recently supported at a general level by a conference organized by the
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne and the Institut européen en sciences
des religions of the École Pratique des Hautes Études. Indeed, under the
title “Conviction, croyance, foi: pistis et fides de Platon aux Pères”,84 the
colloquium tried to trace the origin and development of this central notion
in the religions of the ancient Mediterranean world. At a particular level,
several studies by F. Frazier have already pointed out the central importance
of the notion in Plutarch’s work.85
According to van Kooten, the terms have been traditionally explained
differently depending on their pagan or Christian contexts. While in the for-
mer the term piίστις allows for a variety of interpretations depending on its
immediate context, in the latter it is interpreted exclusively according to
its allegedly theological meaning, which allows for an exclusively “fideis-
tic” interpretation. In the author’s view, this is partly due to the influence
of Luther’s interpretation of Christianity, which was based on faith, and to
Kantian philosophy, which strictly allotted the realms of belief and knowl-
edge to religion and philosophy respectively. The study of Plutarch’s use of
the terms, however, shows that the modern “fideistic” interpretation of pistis
in Pauline writings is barely tenable, since Plutarch’s Moralia also includes
senses such as “persuasion” or “trust”, the religious meaning “belief” and
even a philosophical sort of belief based on reason and proof.
The book draws to a close with an interesting chapter by Israel Muñoz
Gallarte, “The Colors of the Soul”, which once again shows the value of
Plutarch’s treasury of echoes of notions vaguely or firmly held in late antiq-
uity. Muñoz Gallarte focuses on an intriguing subject that is strictly con-
nected with the widely attested belief of the soul’s descent from the divine
region into the world of movement and decay. In fact, this view can be
found in a variety of contexts covering the very wide spectrum from Plato
84 Organized by Ch. Grellard (Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne et Institut Universi-
taire de France), Ph. Hoffmann (École Pratique des Hautes Études) and L. Lavaud (Université
Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne).
85 See the references below, 216 note 4.
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to the Chaldean Oracles. More specifically, the focus of this chapter is the
belief—derived from the intersection between myth, religion, astrology and
philosophy—that during the soul’s descent through the planetary spheres,
the planets give the soul different powers, traits, vices or passions that,
depending on their positive or negative character, help or bother the soul
during its earthly life. Muñoz Gallarte focuses on the association of passions
with certain colors which turn up in pagan, Christian and Christian apoc-
ryphal texts with a view to determining the extent to which we can establish
a common background for views that are clearly related.
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